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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
S T A T E O F U T A H , by and through 
its ROAD COMMISSION, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
W. R O Y B R O W N and E V E L Y N J . 
BROWN, his wife; V A L L E Y B A N K 
& T R U S T COMPANY; ZIONS 
B A N K & T R U S T ; S O U T H L A N D 
CORPORATION (7-11/Stores), 
Defendants and Respondents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
THE SOUTHLAND CORPORATION 
N A T U R E O F T H E CASE 
This is a condemnation action by the State of 
Utah, through its Road Commission, to acquire real 
property along 5300 South Street in Salt Lake County 
for the purpose of constructing an expressway. 
1 
Case No. 
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Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
D I S P O S I T I O N I N L O W E R COURT 
This matter was tried before a jury with the Hon-
orable Joseph G. Jeppsen presiding. The jury re-
turned a verdict in favor of the land owners in the 
amount of $62,840.76 and in favor of the lessee of a 
7-Eleven Store on the premises in the amount of 
$15,767. In addition, by a supplemental verdict, the 
jury awarded damages to the lessee for the loss of fix-
tures and personal property which had been rendered 
useless as a result of the taking, in the amount of $2,-
600. The jury found that of such amount, $1,400 was 
for loss of personal property and $1,200 was for loss 
of property that had been attached to the building. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant-respondent The Southland Corporation, 
the lessee of the property, seeks affirmance of judg-
ment on the verdict. 
S T A T E M E N T O F F A C T S 
Besides being mostly argumentative the State has 
omitted from its statement of facts a number of matters 
necessary to the court's determination. Consequently, 
it is necessary for Southland to expand upon that 
statement. 
I t is undisputed that the building was built espec-
ially for the operation of a 7-Eleven Store and had 
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not been used for any other purpose. (T. 149). The 
change in grade, the limitation of access and particu-
larly the reduction of the parking area, made it im-
possible to carry on the operation of such store after 
the taking. (T. 160). Thus, though it may have been 
a partial taking as to owners, it was a complete taking 
as to their lessee. (T. 161-63). As the property was 
in an expanding residential area and close to a large 
apartment complex, it was a very desirable location 
for the operation of a 7-Eleven store. Since having to 
move from the property, Southland has been unable to 
find another suitable location in the area. (T. 184). 
There was only one witness, Mr. Jerry Webber, 
who testified concerning the value of the leasehold. Al-
though the other appraisal witnesses testified that the 
method Mr. Webber used was the correct method for 
determining the value of a leasehold interest (T. 146, 
T. 270), they had not been asked to compute such value 
and had not done so. (T. 269, T. 303, T. 326). Con-
trary to the State's contention that Mr. Webber was 
willing to testify as to three separate values, he clearly 
testified only as to one and merely computed what the 
value would be assuming economic rent figures testified 
to by the zone manager of Southland, Mr. E . L. Pack. 
(T, 202, T. 225). In addition to the taking of the 
leasehold, a sign, which was stipulated to have a value 
of $1,000, was taken by the State. (R. 431). Certain 
other property utilized in the operation of the store 
became entirely valueless. (T. 165, T. 171). A portion 
of the property was attached to the building and a 
3 
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portion was not. (T. 173-74). The damages awarded 
by the jury were lower than the figures testified to 
by Mr. Pack, the only witness on this subject. 
A R G U M E N T 
P O I N T I 
T H E E V I D E N C E A D M I T T E D B Y T H E 
T R I A L COURT A N D T H E I N S T R U C T I O N S 
G I V E N B Y I T W E R E P R O P E R A N D D I D 
NOT R E S U L T I N A N A W A R D TO D E F E N D -
A N T T H E S O U T H L A N D C O R P O R A T I O N 
E X C E E D I N G J U S T C O M P E N S A T I O N . 
Throughout these proceedings, the State has not 
only adopted the attitude that it had no concern over 
the value of the lease, but that the lessee itself could not 
present independent evidence of its value. This "hands 
off" approach is contrary to the eminent domain sta-
tutes of the State of Utah. Its implementation would, 
in fact, make some provisions of the statutes entirely 
meaningless. In asserting the position that evidence of 
value of the leasehold interest cannot be separately 
given, the State relies on cases from jurisdictions in-
volving different statutory provisions. These contem-
plate a separate hearing to determine values and to 
apportion the award. The Utah statutes provide, how-
ever, for the entire determination at one hearing. Sec-
tion 78-34-10 states: 
The court, jury or referee must hear such legal 
evidence as may be offered by any of the parties 
4 
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to the proceedings and thereupon must ascertain 
and assess: 
(1) The value of the property sought to be 
condemned, and all improvements thereon ap-
pertaining to the realty, and of each and every 
separate estate or interest therein; and if it con-
sists of different parcels the value of each parcel 
and of each estate or interest therein shall be 
separately assessed. (Emphasis added.) 
The language of Subparagraphs (4) and (5) 
makes it even plainer that the various interests are to 
be assessed separately. Section 78-34-10 is subject to 
no other interpretation. The value of the separate 
estates or interests taken are to be ascertained separ-
ately and that by the court or jury which hears the 
evidence. Section 78-34-7 lends support to this con-
clusion. I t provides that all persons claiming an interest 
in the property may defend "each in respect to his 
own property or interest." 
Thus, the State's contention that separate hear-
ings should be had to determine the value of the lease-
hold interest is clearly inappropriate and the cases sup-
porting that argument are clearly inapposite. Since 
under the statute, the various interests are to be assessed 
separately, and the only way that this can be done is 
by producing evidence as to the value of the various 
interests, the State's argument that the court erred in 
admitting such evidence is without merit. (As will be 
pointed out below; this does not mean that the various 
interests need exceed the value of the whole). Since 
it chose to offer no testimony as to the value of the 
5 
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leasehold interests and had instructed its three ap-
praisers to make no such determination, it cannot com-
plain that the only evidence on such value was that 
presented by the lessee. 
As pointed out by the State in its brief (p. 13), 
all witnesses agreed that the rental under the lease, 
"the contract rent," was substantially less than the 
market value, "the economic rent," at the time of tak-
ing . Thus, it is indisputable that Southland, as lessee, 
sustained a loss by the taking. Further, all of the wit-
nesses who testified on the subject, including the state's 
appraisers, agreed as to the accepted method for deter-
mining the value of that loss. As explained by Mr. 
Webber (T. 176-77), the method is very simple. If 
the economic rent exceeds the contract rent, the lessee 
has sustained a loss. The difference, on a monthly 
basis, is multiplied by the number of months remain-
ing on the lease, and the total is reduced to present 
value by means of tables, called Inwood Tables, rec-
ognized throughout the appraising profession. 
Since there was no dispute that Southland had 
sustained a loss or as to the equation used in determin-
ing that loss, and there was no refutation of the figures 
that went into that equation, the verdict in favor of 
Southland cannot be challenged by the State. Neither 
Ogden City v. Stephens, 21 Utah 2d 336, 445 P.2d 
703, (1968), nor the text cited therein, 29A C.J.S., 
Eminent Domain, §198, is at odds with Southland's 
position; instead they support it. The Stevens case 
holds only that the damages sustained by the tenant 
6 
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should be deducted from the total value of the taking. 
That is exactly what was done in this case. Stevens, 
by clear implication, rejects the argument of the State 
that a second hearing should be held or that the lessee 
cannot present independent evidence as to the value 
of the leasehold. 
Decisions in point and involving the same statutory 
language are difficult to find. One such case, however, 
is State ex rel. La Prade v. Carol, 114 P.2d 891 (Ariz., 
1941). The wording of the statute, which is identical 
to Section 78-34-10, was: 
The court or jury shall ascertain and assess: (1) 
The value of the property sought to be con-
demned and all improvements thereon pertain-
ing to the realty, and of each and every separate 
estate or interest therein; if it consists of diff-
erent parcels, the value of each parcel and each 
estate or interest therein shall be separately 
assessed. 
The Arizona Supreme Court, in holding that the 
trial court had erred in failing to separately determine 
the interests of the lessor and lessee stated: 
* * * it will be seen that the statute recognizes 
that if there are separate estates or interests in 
the property, the damages must be separately 
assessed to and apportioned between these in-
terests. 
# # # 
I t is necessary, therefore, that the judgment be 
reversed and the case be remanded for a new 
trial upon the issue of damages for erosion, div-
ersion of drainage, and loss of use as a cattle 
7 
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range, with instructions to apportion the dam-
ages for these elements between the owners of 
the fee and of the leasehold of the land damaged 
as their respective interests may appear. (Em-
phasis added.) 
Another case is State v. Platte Valley Public 
Power & Irrigation District, 23 N.W.2d 300 (Neb., 
1946). There the statute provided: 
If the land taken is held under lease contract, 
a finding shall be made as to the interest of the 
owner in such lease contract and such value shall 
be separately assessed. . . . 
The Nebraska Supreme Court approved a measure of 
compensation based on the sum of the value of the 
separate interests. Citing both Nichols and Orgel, it 
said: 
I t appears from examination of the cases that 
courts have held that the total amount to be paid 
by the condemnor may be less than the value of 
the separate interests, and generally that the sum 
of the separate values of the divided interests 
may not exceed the value of the whole, and that in 
exceptional circumstances the damages to the 
various interests, when added together, may ex-
ceed the value of the property as an unencum-
bered whole. 
The court noted that some courts follow the rule 
that the sum of the values of the divided interests may 
not exceed the value of the unencumbered whole. I t 
pointed out, however, that these courts have abandoned 
the rule that the measure of compensation is what the 
owner has lost and have instead applied a rule that the 
8 
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measure is what the taker has gained. I t concluded 
that under the Nebraska statute, the jury must make a 
finding both as to the value of the fee and the value 
of the leasehold and that such values must be separately 
assessed. In arriving at its decision, the court quotes 
from 29 C.J.S., Eminent Domain, §279, as follows: 
According to some authorities, where two or 
more persons have distinct interests or estates in 
any particular parcel of land, the value of each 
interest should be separately assessed, and this 
may be done either by first ascertaining the 
damages to the fee as if it were owned by one 
person and unencumbered, and then apportion-
ing that amount among all the estates and in-
terests, or in the first instance by appraising 
the value of each separate interest and thus as-
certaining the entire value. 
Another very interesting case is State Highway 
Department v. Thomas, 154 S.E.2d 812, (Ga. 1967). 
Regardless of which method the court chooses to 
follow in the present case the State has no complaint. 
Southland does not contend that the court must adopt 
the ruling of the Nebraska or Georgia Supreme Courts 
in order to sustain the judgment in the present case. 
A review of the instructions and the form of verdict 
given to the jury clearly show that it was instructed 
not to add the separate interests together. The form of 
jury verdict unambiguously told the jury to find the 
total damages resulting from the taking, including sev-
erance damages, and to apportion that between the fee 
owner and the lessee. 
9 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The State, nonetheless, complains of Instructions 
12, 16, 16(b) and 17. A review of these instructions 
readily discloses that its complaints are not well 
founded. Instruction 12 relates primarily to reception 
of expert testimony and is apparently objected to by 
the State on the basis that it tells the jury that they 
can accept the expert witness's opinion as to the value 
of the leasehold interest. Instruction 16, in conformance 
with the Utah statutes, merely tells the jury that they 
must assess the damages to the fee owner and the 
lessee separately. Instruction 17 advises them as to 
the undisputed method of determining the value of the 
leasehold interest. The instruction directly dealing with 
the question is 16(b), and it plainly advised the jury 
that they must first determine what the State must pay 
for damages to the whole and then allocate that amount 
between the two defendants. I t provided, for example: 
You need not allocate the award between the 
lessors and lessee until you decide the total 
amount that should be paid by the State . . . 
After determining what the State should pay 
you then have the problem of allocating the 
amount that the State pays to the two defend-
ants, the lessors and lessee . . . Then said lessee 
had a compensable interest in the property that 
must be paid for out of the total charge made 
against the State . . . (Emphasis added) 
The State also complains about the court's refusal 
to grant its requested instruction No. 37. This in-
struction, symbolizing the State's attitude that any 
testimony regarding the leasehold interest is forbidden, 
10 
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flies directly in the face of the statutes which require 
that the interests be separately assessed. 
To follow the State's position would require that 
the lessee in a condemnation action sit mute through-
out the entire proceedings. I t contemplates that the 
State will offer no evidence of leasehold value and 
that neither may the lessee. Presumably the State 
would make the same objection to the fee owner offer-
ing evidence of the leasehold value, but the fee owner 
generally has no interest in protecting the lessee's 
rights; their interests are often adverse. If the lessee 
is not allowed to look after his own interests, no one 
else will, and the statutory provisions will be effectively 
emasculated. The State's inflexible attitude to the 
contrary is not helpful to the resolution of condemna-
tion cases, either in the settlement stage or at trial. 
Southland's position is not contrary to any of the 
eminent authorities cited in the State's brief. I t does 
not ask that the value of its interest be tacked on to 
the value of the fee owners (although some jurisdic-
tions go that far), but only that it be allowed to offer 
evidence regarding the leasehold interest to be deducted 
from the value of the whole. The State has cited no 
authorities to this court for the proposition that this 
cannot be done. The statutes, and cases construing sim-
ilar statutes, make it clear that this is not only a proper 
procedure but that it is the only logical one to be fol-
lowed. 
H 
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P O I N T I I 
T H E R E W E R E NO O T H E R R E V E R S -
I B L E E R R O R S I N C O N N E C T I O N W I T H T H E 
A W A R D TO S O U T H L A N D W H I C H W O U L D 
R E Q U I R E T H I S COURT TO D I S T U R B T H E 
J U R Y ' S V E R D I C T . 
The State complains of other alleged errors occur-
ring during the course of the trial. In some cases the 
complaints are contrary to the facts and unsupported 
by the record. In other cases, they are not supported 
by either argument or authorities. It , for example, 
argues that Southland's appraiser, Mr. Webber, did 
not recognize the correct valuation date. The record 
throughout discloses that this is a completely erroneous 
statement. On at least seven occasions Mr. Webber 
testified that while the appraisal was made later, it was 
adjusted back to December 22, 1971 (T. 193, T. 200, 
T. 208, T. 220, T. 224, T. 233, T. 235). The practice 
of making an appraisal of a later date and then ad-
justing the figures back to the date in question is a 
common practice in the appraising profession and is 
recognized by courts everywhere. See e.g., Ogden City 
V. Stephens, 21 Utah 2d 336, 445 P.2d 703 (1968). I t 
is true that Mr. Webber, in determining the number 
of months left to run on the lease, used the date that 
Southland actually was forced to abandon the premises, 
but it is clear from his testimony that he made the 
proper adjustments. In any event, had he not done so, 
this would have benefited the State, not Southland. 
12 
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Complaint is also made that Mr. Webber worked 
on the appraisal with his father. The State cites no 
authority that this is improper practice, and indeed it 
could not do so. Mr. Webber was distinctly qualified 
as an expert appraisal witness, and the record is clear 
that the testimony was his own (T. 231). 
Nor is there any basis for complaint in the fact 
that Southland furnished rental figures concerning 
some of its other properties to the appraiser. Inasmuch 
as Southland is the only one that operates 7-Eleven 
Stores in the State of Utah and practically the only 
one that operates convenience food stores in the State, 
it would be the logical one to furnish such figures. In 
fact, the State itself obtained figures regarding rental 
values from Southland, and its appraisers used such 
figures in their computations. (T. 334). In this regard, 
the State's attorney improperly attempted to impeach 
Mr. Webber's testimony by asking him if he had re-
viewed leases on other specified 7-Eleven locations 
without advising the jury that these locations were not 
under lease but were owned directly by Southland. 
(T. 221, T. 332-34). 
The States makes much of the fact that after test-
ifying to the value of the leasehold taken by it, Mr. 
Webber calculated what the value of the property 
would be if Mr. Pack's testimony as to the economic 
rent should be accepted. I t argues that Mr. Webber 
was testifying as to three different figures. However, 
the record clearly shows otherwise. As was recognized 
by the trial court (T. 202), Mr. Webber was merely 
13 
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doing Mr. Pack's arithmetic. H e was applying the 
recognized method for computing the value of a lease-
hold interest to figures supplied him by others. Both 
Mr. Webber and the court made it clear to the jury 
that this was not Mr. Webber's testimony as to value 
(T. 202, T. 211, T. 225), and the jury's verdict made 
it clear that they did not accept the higher figures. The 
verdict was lower than any figure testified to, including 
that of Mr. Webber. Thus, it is clear that the jury was 
not misled as the State contends and in any event it is 
certainly not grounds for reversing the judgment. 
Finally, the State complains about several aspects 
of Mr. Saxton's testimony. Mr. Saxton did not testify 
for Southland. More importantly, whether his approach 
is correct or incorrect, should have no effect upon the 
award to Southland and should not result in its dis-
turbance. Nonetheless, Southland believes that the 
State's objections are either not well founded, or re-
lated to minor matters. In the latter category is the 
complaint that Mr. Saxton did not define "fair market 
value" or "highest and best use." Perhaps he did not in 
manner of the State's witnesses—by rote—but his testi-
mony as a whole establishes that he was aware of these 
concepts. The State's principal argument regarding 
Mr. Saxton's testimony appears to be that he increased 
the value of the land because of the lease, and that he 
should have decreased it. In making this argument, the 
State confuses two concepts. In assessing the value of 
the separate interests, when a lease is "favorable" to 
the lessee, as this one was, the enhanced value to the 
14 
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lessee is deducted from the value of the whole. All of 
the witnesses, including Mr. Saxton, recognized this. 
(T. 115). However, this does not mean that when con-
sidering the value of the whole, a long-term lease to a 
highly solvent company cannot enhance such value. I t 
is clear from Mr. Saxton's testimony that this is the 
basis for his addition of a nominal eleven cents a foot 
to the value of raw land. The State's contention that 
his procedure is faulty "because it allows the parties to 
establish their own market value" is incomprehensible. 
Mr. Webber also testified that having a lease on the 
property could be a favorable factor in determining its 
value and this has been recognized in various decisions. 
A case in point is Arkansas State Highway Com-
mission v. Focc, 322 S.W.2d 81, (Ark. 1969), a con-
demnation action in which it was held that a lease may 
be advantageous to both parties so that the combined 
market value of their separate interests exceeds what 
the property would be worth if the lease has not been 
made, and in which the Arkansas Supreme Court held 
that the separate interests of lessor and lessee should 
not be disregarded. Another such case is State High-
way Department v. Thomas, 154 S.E.2d 812, (Ga. 
App. 1967). 
The State's contention that the severance damages 
awarded by the jury exceeds the severance damage 
testimony at the trial is not accurate. As to Mrs. 
Saxton's testimony, it is purely a matter of approach 
or semantics. A review of testimony shows that he was 
breaking down "severance damages" into two categories 
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and that his testimony regarding such damages would 
support a verdict considerably larger than that re-
turned by the jury. Mr. Saxton put some items what 
would ordinarily be called "severance damage" in the 
value of the actual taking and this was demonstrated 
by the State's attorney during the trial. (T. 105-6, 
129). In any event, the owner of the property, Mr. 
Brown, testified to a severance damage figure substan-
tially in excess of the jury's verdict. (T. 154). 
Apart from whether the verdict was excessive as 
to the fee owner and regardless of whether the evidence 
supported that verdict, the award to Southland should 
not be disturbed. The only testimony before the jury 
regarding the damage to the leasehold was that pre-
sented by Southland. The State's witnesses, while re-
fusing to testify as to the value, agreed that the pro-
cedure utilized by Southland's appraiser was the correct 
procedure. Indeed, even in the State's brief, it does 
not contend that the award to Southland is excessive, 
but only that it should not have been separately as-
sessed. This, Southland believes, has been demonstrated 
to be an erroneous interpretation of the statute. If the 
State felt that the award was excessive, it should have 
put in evidence to that effect. However, it chose to 
offer no evidence whatsoever as to the leasehold value. 
There could be no argument that the jury's verdict was 
not supported by the testimony as it was well within 
the figures testified to. Consequently, whether or not 
the verdict in favor of the fee owner is reversed, that 
in favor of Southland should be allowed to stand. If 
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the case should later be submitted to another jury for 
determination of the value of the entire tract, it would 
be a simple matter to subtract from the figure the dam-
age to the lessee, Southland, without prejudicing the 
rights of any other party. 
P O I N T I I I 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN AL-
LOWING EVIDENCE AS TO THE VALUE 
OF FIXTURES AND PERSONAL PROPERTY 
RENDERED VALUELESS AS A RESULT OF 
THE TAKING. 
The taking by the State made it impossible to 
continue the operation of the 7-Eleven store by South-
land. As a result, certain fixtures and property be-
came entirely valueless and had to be discarded. I t is 
Southland's contention that under the eminent domain 
statutes this loss is or should be compensable. The 
trial court agreed and so instructed the jury. (R. 421). 
The jury, by a supplemental verdict, awarded South-
land $1,200 for property that was attached to the 
building and $1,400 for property that was not. The 
State contends that this is damage which a condemnee 
has to endure and that it is not compensable under any 
circumstances. I t also accuses the trial court of refus-
ing to follow the law in this regard. (Appellant's brief 
P . 29). 
Southland submits that there is no law in the state 
which was transgressed by the trial court here. The 
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cases cited by the State do not so hold. Utah Road 
Commission v. Hansen, 14 Ut.2d 305, 383 P.2d 917, 
(1963), merely holds that the cost of removing retained 
personal property from condemned realty is not com-
pensable. State v. Papanikolas, 19 Ut.2d 153, 427 P.2d 
749, (1967), if anything, supports Southland rather 
than the State. There the court held that damages and 
severance damages to fixtures on the property taken 
by eminent domain were compensable. I t did not allow 
compensation for those fixtures on property not actu-
ally taken, but in that case no lessee was involved. In 
the present case, the taking as to Southland was in 
fact a total taking. The property or fixtures attached 
to the building were entirely lost to it. To refuse to 
allow compensation would be in derogation of Article 
1, Section 22, of the Utah Constitution, which pro-
hibits the taking or damaging of private property for 
public use without just compensation. A number of 
cases have so recognized. For example in Wilkes v. 
Iowa State Highway Commission, 172 N.W.2d 790, 
(Iowa, 1969), it was held that allowance should be 
made for personal property held by a lessee and used by 
him in connection with the condemned land. The court 
ruled that the lessee should recover for the loss or re-
duction in value of his personal property in order to 
be made whole. See also, Interstate Finance Corpora-
tion v. Iowa City, 149 N.W.2d 308, (Iowa, 1967). 
In Cooney Brothers v. State of New York, 24 N.Y. 
2d 387, 248 N.E.2d 585, (N.Y., 1969), it was held that 
a lessee in a condemnation action could recover for the 
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loss of value of fixtures even though not located on the 
property actually appropriated if their economic utility 
is destroyed by the taking. A case holding that taking 
is a total taking as to lessee when the property is no 
longer usable for the purpose for which it was leased 
is Esso Standard Oil v. State, 181 N.Y.S.2d 578, 
(1958). This is a case which also strongly supports 
Southland with respect to its claim that its interests 
should be separately assessed and the manner in which 
the assessment should be made. The provisions in the 
lease regarding condemnation are, in fact, almost iden-
tical to those in the present case. 
The State complains that various figures regard-
ing the value of the attached and unattached property 
were testified to. There was testimony regarding the 
original cost, value at the time of the taking and value 
at the time Southland moved from the premises as to 
both categories. This naturally resulted in several diff-
erent figures. However, the j u ry was obviously not as 
confused as the State's attorney. F o r example, it found 
that the value of the attached property lost to South-
land was $1,200. Mr. Pack had testified that the value 
as of the date he terminated the building was $1,000 
and that this would be one-third higher as of the date 
of the taking. 
The State also argues that Mr. Pack was allowed 
to testify as to business operations and that he did not 
know the difference between fixtures and personal prop-
erty. Mr. Pack's testimony regarding business opera-
tions was preliminary and was directed toward showing 
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that the operation of a 7-Eleven store on the property 
was not feasible after the taking. Certainly, this was 
competent evidence. The fact that he did not know the 
legal distinction between fixtures and personal prop-
erty is no reason to invalidate his testimony. The court 
was correct in holding that this called for a legal con-
clusion. (T. 168). 
Southland submits that in order to properly com-
pensate it, the verdict for both the personal property 
and the fixtures should stand. In any event, loss of the 
fixtures is a compensable item, and since the amounts 
have been determined separately by a supplemental 
verdict, if this court should determine that either or 
both are not compensable, the non-compensable por-
tion can readily be eliminated. 
CONCLUSION 
The two-hearing approach advocated by the State 
is not warranted under the Utah statutes. Is adoption 
would not result in just compensation, but would pre-
clude the admission of relevant evidence necessary to 
arrive at just compensation where there are multiple 
interests. Its adoption is not necessary to preclude the 
court or jury from returning a verdict, which exceeds 
a fair and equitable award. This can be accomplished, 
as it was in this case, in one hearing. 
I t is undisputed that Southland was forced out of 
business by the taking. I t lost a lease which would have 
run for another twenty-one years and it will have to 
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pay at least $150 a month more for a comparable loca-
tion over that period. Thus, it is readily apparent that 
Southland sustained a considerable loss for which it 
should be compensated. 
The verdicts were not excessive and were supported 
by substantial evidence. There was, in fact, no other 
evidence as to the lessee upon which the jury could base 
an award except that presented by the lessee. Such 
evidence was in accord with established principals and 
there is nothing to warrant reversal of the judgment 
as to Southland, regardless of whether or not the total 
award is deemed to be excessive. There were no other 
procedural errors during the course of the trial which 
would warrant reversal of the judgment. The jury's 
verdict, being based upon substantial evidence and in 
accordance with applicable law, should not be disturbed 
by this court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Ralph L. Jerman 
B. L. Dart, J r . 
Jerman & Dart 
Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent 
The Southland Corporation 
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